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STUDENT COMMENTS
RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION AFTER "SCHWINN"
A manufacturer typically distributes its goods through a succession of
middlemen, wholesalers and retailers. This procedure, while it relieves the
manufacturer of the expense and difficulty of assuming its own marketing
functions,' deprives it of full control over its product's distribution. 2 A
manufacturer may desire this control to prevent tort liability or loss of good-
will which could result from improper handling of its product by distributors.
The manufacturer may also desire to influence prices and distribution costs
or to insure that its product's full sales potential is realized.
A measure of control sufficient to protect these interests may be achieved
through contractual arrangements between the manufacturer and its whole-
salers and retailers.3 For example, some manufacturers have sought to control
important aspects of distribution by contractually limiting the persons to
whom a wholesaler may resell the product. This arrangement—a vertically
imposed customer limitation4—is aimed at excluding undesirable retailers.
Similarly, some manufacturers have contractually limited the territories in
which the dealer may trade, thereby providing an incentive for the dealer
to develop fully that territory's sales potential.
The justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have re-
cently challenged the legality of vertically imposed territorial and customer
limitations under the antitrust laws. 5 In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
1 See Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public
Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 506 (1965). For example, it was estimated
that for automobile manufacturers to integrate to accomplish their own distribution
would require an investment of nearly 5 billion dollars, compared to the total invest-
ment by these manufacturers of approximately 7 billion dollars in all other functions.
Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas under the Anti-Trust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 111 n.1 (1962).
2 See Chaffee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 946-48
(1928) ; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution under the Sherman Act, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 795, 819 (1962).
3 A manufacturer may impose contractual limitations on its distributors for other
reasons. For example, a manufacturer of a patented product may want to maximize
profits by requiring that its distributors sell only to customers who will use the
product in a certain way. For the validity of this practice, see General Talking Pictures
v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
4 For purposes of this article, "vertically imposed" or "vertical" restrictions will
refer to restrictions imposed by a party at one level of distribution or production on
parties at another level. Most vertical restraints originate with the manufacturer. "Hori-
zontal" or "horizontally imposed" restrictions are those which are initiated by parties
who are competing at the same level of distribution or production, but parties from
several levels of production or distribution may eventually participate. See pp. 1039-42
infra, for a discussion of the legal implications of this distinction.
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Sr Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) ; White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir.
1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). Use of these
restraints has long been under attack, but until recently, only in combination with other
restrictive practices such as price fixing. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United




Co.,° the Government achieved a major victory in the United States Supreme
Court. Because of the impact of this case on the legality of these important
marketing practices, this comment will examine the Schwinn decision in light
of prior law and Sherman Act policy. This comment will also consider the
implications of the case on future use of vertically imposed customer and
territorial restrictions.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE " SCHWINN "
 DECISION
A. Schwinn's Distribution System?
Although Arnold, Schwinn and Company was the largest domestic
producer of bicycle products, after World War II its management felt a new
sales program was required to meet competition from foreign manufacturers
and manufacturers selling through mass merchandizers like Sears, Roebuck
and Company, and Montgomery Ward and Company.° Beginning in 1949,
Schwinn made extensive studies of its marketing practices. These studies
revealed that after Schwinn sold its product to its retailers, it had almost
no control over their distribution. Of the approximately 15,000 retail accounts
on Schwinn mailing lists, Schwinn discovered that only about one quarter
were active, and that a small number of the active accounts were responsible
for a disproportionately large number of sales. These findings troubled
Schwinn's management. Not only did carrying inactive and small volume
accounts significantly increase administrative and promotional expenses, but
Schwinn found that "random and haphazard sales methods" were inter-
fering with its efforts to establish a more successful sales program in which
active or aggressive retailers would be used.
To correct the defects that these studies revealed, Schwinn completely
revamped its distribution system. At the heart of the new distribution system
were vertically imposed customer and territorial limitations. Two kinds of
customer limitations were adopted. Wholesalers were requested to agree to
sell only to approved retailers, and approved retailers were required to agree
to sell only to consumers. Territorial restrictions were imposed on all whole-
salers; they agreed to sell only within their assigned territories (all assigned
territories were mutually exclusive). Schwinn's management hoped its new
distribution system would assure all dealers a market having an adequate
sales potential, would establish stability and efficiency in distribution and
would assure Schwinn of a competent and aggressive group of dealers.
Schwinn accomplished three types of distribution through this restricted
system. First, most of its sales were made to franchised retailers under the
"Schwinn Plan." This plan called for Schwinn to ship the product to the
0 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
7 The following discussion is derived from information in the District Court opinion
and Schwinn's brief before the Supreme Court. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. III. 1965) ; Brief, and Appendix, for Appellee, 388 U.S.
365 (1967).
8 Schwinn had previously sold through Sears, Roebuck and Co. but, at about this
time, Scars required its bicycle suppliers to label their products with Sears' brand names
rather than the brand names of the manufacturer. Schwinn refused to follow this practice
because it felt such action would compromise the high prestige of Schwinn's own brand.
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retailer on credit and to invoice the retailer directly.9
 A commission was
paid to the wholesaler servicing the territory in which the retailer was
located, even though the wholesaler's function was, at most, to forward
orders to Schwinn. Second, Schwinn sold products to various wholesale out-
lets for resale to approved retailers and sold to firms like B.F. Goodrich
which handled their own wholesaling and retailing. Schwinn's third method
of distribution was by consignment or agency arrangements with a few
wholesalers. Under the consignment method of distribution, the wholesaler-
consignee took possession of the bicycles and sold them to franchised re-
tailers. Schwinn insured the goods and retained title until they were sold.
The wholesaler then paid Schwinn for the insurance and the goods. Under
Schwinn's agency agreements, Schwinn leased floor space from wholesalers
and shipped bicycles to that space. The wholesaler-agent handled the sales
of these bicycles to franchised retailers and billed them on Schwinn's invoices.
Schwinn paid a commission to the wholesaler for these services.
In 1958, the Justice Department sought an injunction against Schwinn,
Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association, an association of Schwinn's whole-
salers, and B.F. Goodrich Companyl° in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the distribution practices
of these parties restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act." In substance, the Government alleged three main restraints of trade:
price fixing,' 2
 territorial limitations on wholesalers, and customer limitations
on wholesalers and retailers.
B. The Court Decisions
The district court decided that the Schwinn case was controlled by
the holding in White Motor Co. v. United States. 13 In White Motor, the
Supreme Court found that there was insufficient evidence of the anticompet-
itive effects of vertically imposed customer and territorial limitations to
declare them per se illegal; that is, illegal regardless of any justifications for
their imposition." Instead, the Court held that an independent examina-
tion of their anticompetitive effects and the justification for their use must
be made in each case to determine whether their use was reasonable under
the circumstances. The district court, in Schwinn, examined the legality of
9 Orders from retailers were sent either directly to Schwinn or to a wholesaler who
in turn forwarded the order to Schwinn. In either case, Schwinn billed the retailer directly.
10 The action against B.F. Goodrich was settled by a consent decree. See United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,445 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal . . . ,
12 The district court found no factual basis for the charge of price fixing and dis-
missed it. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 332 (1965). The
Government did not appeal this finding.
13 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
14 For examples of cases holding other practices to be per se illegal, see Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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Schwinn's territorial and customer limitations under this "rule of reason."15
It upheld the customer restrictions on retailers since it found that those
restrictions did no more than prevent the retailer from acting as a whole-
saler for unapproved outlets. The court found customer limitations on
Schwinn's wholesalers to be legal, likening the wholesaler's status to that
of an "agent" upon whom such restrictions could lawfully be imposed."
In addition, the court found that customer limitations on both wholesalers
and retailers were necessary to Schwinn's survival as a competitor in the
bicycle industry. The court drew a distinction between territorial limitations
imposed on wholesalers who were purchasers of Schwinn's products, and
wholesalers who acted under the agency, consignment and Schwinn Plan
distributions as agents of Schwinn. The court upheld territorial restrictions
imposed on Schwinn's wholesalers under either the consignment or agency
distribution plan, but held them illegal when imposed on wholesalers who
were purchasers. The court felt that these latter restrictions resulted in a
horizontal division of markets, an established illegal restraint under the
Sherman Act."
Schwinn and its distributors did not appeal the finding that the terri-
torial restrictions imposed on purchasers were illegal. The Government ap-
pealed the district court's holding that Schwinn's territorial restrictions on
agents and all of Schwinn's customer limitations were legal."
While the Government had urged in the district court that customer
restrictions were a per se violation of the Sherman Act, it abandoned this
approach in the Supreme Court. Instead it argued that Schwinn's limitations
were illegal under White Motor because the restraint they produced was un-
reasonable under the circumstances." In spite of this change in the Govern-
ment's contentions, the Supreme Court held that Schwinn's customer limita-
tions were illegal per se when imposed on the resale of products which the
wholesalers and retailers had purchased. The Court distinguished Schwinn's
customer and territorial restrictions imposed in the agency, consignment and
Schwinn Plan distributions and examined them under the rule of reason. 2°
In these situations, the Court found that the restrictions were reasonable,
and, therefore, lawful.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented in part, 21
reasoning that the economic factors which established the legality of
15 For a discussion of the "rule of reason," see Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
16 The district court cited no authority for this proposition. In fact the district
court opinion is remarkable for its lack of cited authority for any conclusion of law
drawn by the court.
17 The leading case holding horizontal market division illegal per se is Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
18 Direct appeal was taken pursuant to § 2 of the Expediting Act. 15 U.S.C. 29
(1964).
10 In response to a direct question from the bench during oral argument before the
Court, counsel for the Government disclaimed any intention of arguing for a per se rule.
See 35 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. April 25, 1967).
20 Schwinn's agency and consignment sales program will be referred to henceforth
in this article by their generic description, agency.
21 388 U.S. at 382.
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Schwinn's restrictions in an agency context were equally applicable in a
sales context. In addition, they criticized the majority for adopting a rule
which would force manufacturers to assume their own distribution functions
or to distribute through agents. They argued that such a rule was contrary to
the broad antitrust objective of promoting small independent merchants. 22
IL RESTRICTIONS ON PURCHASERS ARE ILLEGAL PER SE
By departing, in part, from the rule-of-reason approach used in White
Motor, the Court in Schwinn announced a new set of rules for determining
the legality of vertically imposed customer restrictions. By dicta, the Court
made it clear that its new rules would also apply to vertically imposed
territorial limitations. Because Schwinn announces new rules in an important
area of antitrust law, the opinion warrants extensive examination.23
A. Support in Prior Law
In Schwinn, the Court relied on the rule against restraints on alienation
to declare vertically imposed customer and territorial restrictions illegal per
se outside of an agency context. The rule against restraints on alienation
prohibits a vendor from attaching a condition of sale which interferes with
the purchaser's freedom to resell the property. 24
 The rule is derived from the
early common law, but it has retained considerable vitality today as a rule
of property law.25
 The Court applied the rule to avoid creating a logical
22 Schwinn announced soon after the decision that it would evetually integrate to
assume its own distribution function. Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Law. 669, 686
(1968). Between the start of the Schwinn litigation and the argument before the
Supreme Court, Schwinn took over 30% of its wholesaling by vertical integration. 388
U.S. at 387 n.9 (dissenting opinion). It would appear that the dissent's fear that Schwinn
would force vertical integration was well founded.
Schwinn's per se rule is properly limited to vertical customer limitations. But the
Court makes it quite clear that its rationale also extends to vertical territorial limitations
on purchasers. See 388 U.S. at 371 & n.4. It is also arguable that other kinds of vertical
restrictions such as profit passovers, areas of prime responsibility and exclusive territories
all within the broad rationale of the Court. See Address by Edwin M. Zimmerman, First
Assistant, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1967 Federal Bar Ass'n, Annual Con-
vention, in San Francisco, California, July 28, 1967:
[C]ontractual terms such as area of prime responsibility clauses, profit pass-
overs, location clauses and the like, even though not formulated as "restraints"
upon resale, will suffer the fate of Schwinn restrictions if in operation they
effectively serve to bar interterritorial sales or to prevent sales to specified classes
of customers.
But see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 36 U.S.L.W. 4171, 4174 (U.S. March 5, 1968), where
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, indicated that territorial restrictions will be
treated under the rule of reason.
24 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); 2 Coke, Institutes § 360
(1812).
25 See, e.g., McFadden v. McFadden, 302 Ill. 504, 135 N.E. 31 (1922) where the
court invalidated a restraint on real property forbidding voluntary inter vivos alienation
for twenty years; Bowen v. Campbell, 344 Mass. 24, 181 N.E.2d 342 (1962) where the
court stated that a restraint on alienation will fail if it extends beyond the period of the
rule against perpetuities. See also Note, Section 202 of the Delaware Corporation Law—
Per Se Rules for Stock Transfer Restrictions, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 405, 407-08
1036
RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION
inconsistency with its interpretation of the lower court's holding. The Court
reasoned that since the lower court had found Schwinn's territorial restric-
tions to be illegal per se when imposed on customers, and since customer
restrictions interfered with a purchaser's freedom to resell his property to
the same degree, Schwinn's customer limitations were also illegal per se. 28
The Court failed to notice, or chose to ignore, that the district court had
not based its holding on the rule against restraints on alienation. In fact, the
lower court never mentioned that doctrine. It found territorial limitations
to be illegal because they were horizontal divisions of markets, a restraint
which has been declared illegal per se, but not because of the rule against
restraints on alienation."
It is apparent that the logical inconsistency upon which the Court
sought to avoid was nonexistent, and if the opinion is to be supported, other
grounds must be sought. Two possible bases for support of Schwinn's per se
rule exist in prior law: the rule against restraints on alienation as an anti-
trust doctrine or an analogy to the per se rule which has been applied to
horizontally imposed restraints, which are similar to the vertically imposed
restraints in Schwinn.
In order to understand the validity and ramifications of a rationale for
a per se rule based on the rule against restraints on alienation, it is necessary
to examine the common law prohibition. Even at common law, the rule against
restraints on alienation was not absolute. 28 The doctrine of ancillary re-
straints developed to correct injustice which resulted from vigorous application
of the rule. The common law doctrine of ancillary restraint allowed a reason-
able restraint on alienation if the restraint was necessary to accomplish some
legitimate purpose. It was applied in a limited class of cases usually involving
purchase and sale of goodwill interest. 2°
Early in the development of antitrust law, the courts recognized that
the Sherman Act's prohibition of restraints of trade also prohibited restraints
(1968), for a discussion of the relevance of restraints on alienation to the legality of
stock transfer restrictions.
20 388 U.S. at 377-78.
27 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). In this
leading case the Court did not rely on restraints against alienation to declare hori-
zontal divisions of markets to be illegal per se. The Court stated that the restraint was
illegal because the only purpose of the restraint was to eliminate competition between
the conspirators.
28 See Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 Va. L. Rev.
1667, 1684-85 (1967) ; Restatement of Contracts II 513, 514, 515(d), .516 (1932).
29 The following are examples of situations where the common Iaw doctrine of
ancillary restraints permitted a restraint on alienation:
(1) A seller could restrain a buyer from competing in derogation of the property sold.
(2) A retiring partner could be restrained from competing with the partnership.
(3) A person about to enter a partnership could be restrained from competing with
the firm.
(4) A buyer of property could be restrained from competing with the business retained
by a seller.
(5) An agent or servant could be restrained from competing with his principal or
master.
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). Sec also Restatement of Contracts 516 (1932).
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on alienation. Likewise, the doctrine of ancillary restraints was held to be
part of the antitrust law in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States. B° The
doctrine was called the rule of reason in its antitrust application. 3 ' Further
development broadened the doctrine well beyond the common law limitation
to cases involving protection of goodwill. In United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 32 the court described the modern scope of the doctrine:
Where challenged conduct is subservient or ancillary to a
transaction which is itself legitimate [for example distribution of
one's products] . . . . the doctrine of ancillary restraints is to be
applied. It permits, as reasonable, a restraint which (1) is reason-
ably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the arrange-
ment, and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2)
does not unreasonably affect competition in the market place; and
(3) is not imposed by a party or parties with monopoly power. 33
A distaste for restraints upon alienation still inheres in the antitrust law.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.," a case relied on
by the Court in Schwinn, the Supreme Court held that resale price maintain-
ance35 effectuated through restraints on alienation was illegal per se. That
case, however, does not compel the result reached in Schwinn. Even in Dr.
Miles, the Court recognized that the presence of a restraint on alienation
was only the beginning of the required analysis:
The rule laid down [in the common law] is no longer regarded as
inflexible, and has been considerably modified. Public welfare is
first considered, and if it not be involved, and the restraint upon one
party is not greater than protection to the other party requires, the
contract may be sustained."
The last case to consider the rule against restraints on alienation before
Schwinn is White Motor Co. v. United States, 37 the case relied upon by the
district court in Schwinn. There, the Court recognized that the vertically
imposed customer and territorial limitations before it resulted in a restraint
on alienation, but it refused to hold them per se illegal and instead remanded
30 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
31 An early view of the kinds of conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act was that
the Act only restated the common law prohibition of restraints on trade. H. Therelli, The
Federal Antitrust Policy 222 (1954). This view gained credence from the similarity be-
tween Addyston Pipe's statements on conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act and the
common law prohibition of restraints on trade. Compare United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir, 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1399) with Restatement
of Contracts §§ 513-16 (1932).
32 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
sa Id. at 178.
34 220 U.S. 373 (1911) .
35 Resale price maintainance occurs when the manufacturer requires its dealers not
to resell below a specified price. It is a form of vertical price fixing. Horizontal price
fixing was among the earliest restraints to be declared illegal per se. See United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
36 220 U.S. at 406.
37 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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the case so that the district court could consider the reasonableness of the
restraint involved. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
[A] restraint on alienation . . . is . . . historically and inherently
suspect under the antitrust laws. That proposition does not, how-
ever, tell us that every form of such restraint is utterly without
justification and is therefore to be deemed unlawful per se.38
Apparently the Court has changed its position.
Although courts traditionally tested the legality of vertically imposed
territorial and customer limitations under the rule of reason, equivalent re-
strictions have been declared illegal per se where they have been imposed
horizontally. Market divisions between competitors (horizontally im-
posed territorial restrictions) and group boycotts by competitors (horizontally
imposed customer restrictions) have both been held to be per se violations
of the Sherman Act." The illegality of these horizontal restraints suggests
that the same rule may be appropriate in vertical cases since once the
restraint is established, it would appear to be irrelevant from what source
it originated. While Schwinn did not follow White Motor with respect to
White Motor's suggested rule-of-reason approach, Schwinn did find in White
Motor a distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints of a similar
nature. Although later cases have made the distinction between horizontal
and vertical restrictions less clear, 40 it is submitted that the Court was
correct in Schwinn in using such a distinction.
The difference between vertical and horizontal restraints may be illus-
trated by comparing Schwinn with United States v. General Motors. 4 ' Both
cases presented customer limitations. In Schwinn, the manufacturer at-
tempted to limit middlemen to supplying only those outlets it approved. In
General Motors, the manufacturer and its franchised dealers combined to
prevent discount houses from selling the manufacturer's products and the
Court held that this combination was illegal. In both cases, the manufacturer
and its dealers agreed to the restriction. The Court in Schwinn, however,
distinguished General Motors as a case involving horizontal restraints. The
key difference between the cases was the party who initiated the restraint. In
Schwinn, the manufacturer unilaterally initiated the restraint and imposed
it on its dealers. In contrast, the restraint in General Motors was initiated
by competing dealers who were attempting to deprive discount houses of
38 Id. at 265. See also Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8,
27-28 (1918) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ; Baker, Agency and Consignment Selling, 9
Antitrust Bull. 299 (1964) ; Pollock, Franchising, Customer Restrictions, and Building
a Better Mousetrap, 10 Antitrust Bull. 381 (1965). Professor Chaffee has suggested that
the developing doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels can be applied to uphold such
restrictions if the restraint in the particular case does not otherwise conflict with public
policy. Chaffee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels,
69 Hare. L. Rev. 1250 (1956) ; Chaffee, supra note I.
89 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal
territorial restrictions) ; Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941) (horizontal customer restrictions).
40 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
41. Id .
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General Motors automobiles. 42
 The dealers supplied the impetus for the
restraint and brought the manufacturer into the conspiracy to enforce the
agreement.
Because the dealers rather than the manufacturer initiated the restraint
in General Motors, that case does not determine the legality of the restric-
tions in Schwinn, even though Schwinn presents an otherwise very similar
limitation. Horizontal cases are distinguishable from vertical cases because
the rationale of the per se rules for horizontal restraints depends on the fact
that the parties initiating the restraint are in competion with each other. 43
Because the party initiating a vertical restraint is not in competition with
the restrained parties, the reason horizontal restraints are per se illegal have
no applicability to vertical restraints.
A rule of per se illegality for horizontal territorial and customer limita-
tions developed in the following way: The courts discovered from experience
with several cases that, except in very rare circumstances, the ultimate
purpose of the parties initiating the restraint was to bring about a result
which was contrary to antitrust policy. They discovered that horizontal
divisions of markets and group boycotts were agreements whose ultimate
purpose was to lessen the competition of others on the same level of distri-
bution as those agreeing to the restraint." The restraints were found to have
an anticompetitive impact on markets because they stiffled competition either
by depriving competitors of the goods they require to compete or by elimin-
ating competition among the parties agreeing to the restraint. Furthermore,
the courts found from experience that the intended purpose was achieved in
a substantial number of cases.45
 Rather than make the elaborate inquiry
which would be required to isolate the few cases where the restriction had a
42 Many of General Motors' dealers in the Los Angeles area became concerned
with the large number of automobiles being sold through discount houses. The source
of supply for the discount houses was a few General Motors dealers in the area. The
dealers initiated a policy of forbidding all dealers from selling to discount houses. These
dealers enlisted General Motors' aid to force these agreements on recalcitrant dealers
and to help enforce the agreements.
43 See Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 697-99 (1962) (the author
stated that while the fact that the manufacturer has an interest in competition between
its dealers is insufficient to justify vertical price fixing, it may be sufficient to distinguish
vertical customer and territorial restraints from similar horizontal restrictions) ; Stone,
Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 286 (1963) ; Note, supra note 2, at 800-01. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966) (the
author states that all vertical restraints should be legal because they are introduced for
the manufacturer's benefit). But see Preston, supra note 1, at 510.
44 See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941) ; United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 307, 310 (N.D. Ohio
1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940) ; Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
42 As stated in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
"knowledge of intent may help the Court to interpret facts and to predict consequences."
In United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 307 (ND. Ohio 1949),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the court was able to see an actual reduction in competition
from the imposition of the restraint.
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purpose or effect other than reduction of competition, the courts declared all
horizontal divisions of markets and group boycotts to be per se violations
of the Sherman Act.
In contrast, the ultimate purpose of the party initiating a vertical
territorial or customer limitation may not be to lessen competition. For
example, a manufacturer may impose customer limitations to prevent in-
competent dealers from distributing its product. The manufacturer in such
a case intends to reduce competition only in the sense that it realizes that
there will be fewer dealers competing with its competent dealers." Its
ultimate purpose, to insure proper handling of its product as it is distributed,
is not necessarily inconsistent with antitrust policy.'"
The purpose of the parties initiating the restraint is not, however, the
only consideration. Ultimately, the legality of either a horizontal or vertical
restraint must turn on its potential effects. 48 In theory, perhaps, the effects
of either horizontal or vertical restraints would seem to be the same. Like-
wise, once the vertical restraint is established, its operation and therefore
its effect would be identical with a similar horizontal restraint even though
the restraints were originated differently. Since the interests of the parties
initiating vertical restrictions differ from the interests of the parties initiating
horizontal restrictions, however, it is doubtful that the theoretical identity of
effect would in fact result."
The very reason why dealers would initiate horizontal restraints—to
reduce dealer competition—may be antithetical to a manufacturer's interest. 5°
In general, a manufacturer wants to foster competition among its dealers
because it benefits from the lower prices, higher volume and better service
such competition may inspire.°1 The manufacturer, therefore, would not be
expected to impose customer and territorial restrictions on its dealers unless
the reduction in competition were only incidental to some other effect. Thus,
the situations in which the manufacturer imposes customer and territorial
restrictions may differ greatly from those which the courts have examined
in determining the legality of horizontal restrictions. Since horizontal and
vertical restraints are likely to be imposed in different situations, there can
be no assurance that their effects will be identical." Furthermore, even if
48 A reduction in the number of retail outlets necessarily results in fewer com-
peting units at that level, and in that sense, less competition. To this extent a manufac-
turer intends to reduce competition since the necessary consequences of an act are pre-
sumed to have been intended. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211, 234 (1899).
47 See Jordan, supra note 1, at 154; Stone, supra note 43, at 300-01.
48 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). But see United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 182 (1911) ; United States v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 307 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49 Stone, supra note 42, at 299-300.
15° Id. at 301; Jordan, supra note 1, at 114.
151 Stone, supra note 43, at 301; Note, supra note 2, at 800.
52 Jordan, supra note 1, at 153. See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor
Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957) ; Schwing Motor Co.
v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F.2d Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176
(4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's
Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Preston, supra note 1, at 510.
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a serious reduction in competition between dealers were to result from a
vertical restriction, there can be no assurance that the manufacturer would
continue to enforce it.
It is apparent that prior law did not compel Schwinn's per se rule. In
fact, prior law indicates that the Court should have used a rule-of-reason
approach. Schwinn, therefore, establishes a new per se violation of the
Sherman Act; one based on an estimation of the antitrust significance of a
violation of the ancient rule against restraints on alienation.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not present an economic analysis
to justify the result it reached or examine Schwinn's restraints in light of
antitrust policy. The importance of the rule against restraints on alienation
to modern antitrust policy was never examined, although it would seem
critical to the validity of the Court's position. If other economic or policy
considerations influenced the Court, they were not discussed in the opinion.
For purposes of this comment it is necessary to determine the policy implica-
tions of territorial and customer restrictions aside from their violation of the
rule against restraints on alienation to see if the Court's per se rule can be
justified on any grounds.
B. Support in Sherman Act Policy
The courts have not yet provided a definitive statement on the broad
objective of the Sherman Act. It is clear, however, that "free competition"
is a major concern if not the ultimate objective of Sherman Act policy.°
Trade practices such as customer and territorial restraints do interfere with
complete freedom of competition, but such an effect need not make them
illegal per se. If a compelling business or social need for such restraints can
be demonstrated to exist in more than a few circumstances, it is appropriate
to treat them under the rule of reason." To determine which rule to apply
it is therefore necessary to examine the precise anticompetive effect of these
restraints and balance this effect with their possible justifications.
1. Closed Territories—There are three common types of territorialization
devices: closed territories, profit passovers, and areas of prime responsibility.
Closed territories result when a manufacturer assigns only one dealer to an
area and confines the dealer's sales to that area. A profit passover requires
a dealer who sells outside of its territory to "pass over" or share profit on
the sale with the dealer serving the invaded territory. The third, the area of
prime responsibility, allows a dealer to Sell in any territory, but requires that
it meet a certain sales quota in its own territory. Profit passovers and areas
of prime responsibility inhibit sales outside of a dealer's territory, but unlike
68 "The very aim of all the anti-trust laws is to ban conduct and practices which
destroy free and unhampered competition." United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284, 307 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899) ; United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
54 See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ; Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911).
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closed territories, do not eliminate such sales." Schwinn chose to use closed
territories, the most restrictive territorialization device.
A manufacturer may wish to impose closed territories on its dealers
for a number of reasons. It may impose them because it realizes that in
order to obtain desired dealers it must offer the dealers a degree of freedom
from competition." The manufacturer may also wish to impose closed ter-
ritories to satisfy its own primary rather than derivative self interest. It
may wish to free its dealers from competition in its brand in order to in-
crease their ability to compete against rival brands. Often, a closed territory
results from a combination of such considerations. 57 A distributor may insist
on being the manufacturer's exclusive dealer in an area. In turn, the manu-
facturer may aquiesce only if the dealer agrees to confine its sales to that
area. The dealer then receives the desired protection from competition and
the manufacturer receives a measure of assurance that the territory will be
covered adequately.
Closed territories produce a definite anticompetitive effect: they com-
pletely eliminate competition between dealers in the manufacturer's product."
The public must rely on competition between the manufacturer's dealers and
the dealers of rival manufacturers and is thereby deprived of the benefits
which might have been derived from competition among the manufacturer's
dealers.59 Because this effect is obviously contrary to Sherman Act policy,
only convincing justification will exclude closed territories from the proper
scope of a per se rule.
Three general kinds of justifications have been advanced: (1) increased
efficiency in distribution;" (2) increased market coverage for the manu-
facturer's brand;" (3) increased competition between the manufacturer's
brand and the brands of rival manufacturers."
Several efficiencies may result from closed territories because, by reduc-
ing competition between dealers, a manufacturer is able to develop a more
orderly distribution system. If territories are properly allocated, all distrib-
utors will be assured of an area with a sufficient sales potential. By guarantee-
ing sales in that market to the dealer, fewer dealers will fail, and the manu-
facturer is relieved of the burden of constantly acquiring dealers to replace
those who have failed. In addition, administration of an orderly and stable
distribution system is less costly." For example, a manufacturer can more
55 For general background on the use of these kinds of restraints see Note, Re-
stricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 814-17
(1962).
56 Stone, supra note 43, at 301; Note, supra note 55, at 809-10.
57 Note, supra note 55, at 809.
58 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911).
59 Id. at 409.
69 See Bork, supra note 43, at 375, 391; Note, supra note 55, at 813.
61 See Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and
Public Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob., 506, 511 (1965) ; Stone, supra note
43, at 310; Note, supra note 55, at 812-13.
62 See Baker, supra note 38, at 302-03; Stone, supra note 43, at 311; Note, supra
note 55, at 800.
63 Note, supra note 55, at 813.
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easily plan future production since a dealer's estimates of sales are more likely
to be accurate.
It is questionable, however, that the cost and planning efficiencies which
result from closed territories are valid antitrust defenses. Sherman Act policy
favoring free competition is due in part to the influence of competitive pres-
sures on businessmen, forcing them to keep abreast of innovations in tech-
nology and improvements in marketing practices. It is these long-run effi-
ciencies which are fostered by the Sherman Act." Justifying closed territories
on the basis of short-run cost savings at the expense of those long-run goals
would not seem consistent with the policy of the Sherman Act."
The second justification for closed territories is that they result in
increased market coverage. Since a dealer subject to closed territories may
increase sales only by more fully cultivating its own territory, it will devote
more attention to marginal accounts in that territory which might otherwise
have been ignored. Since high profit accounts in the territory are guaranteed
to the dealer, sufficient funds should be available to finance this promotion."
Some manufacturers must offer the protection of closed territories in order
to attract dealers to handle their products.67
This justification is not convincing, however, because less restrictive
practices which produce substantially the same result are available." Some
elimination of market coverage by restraining dealers can be achieved through
use of profit passovers or areas of prime responsibility." These restrictions
are more easily justified because they produce effects that are less anti-
competitive. Also, the manufacturer may further stimulate market coverage
through advertising or by personally covering marginal accounts.
The alternative methods of stimulating market coverage are not entirely
satisfactory from the manufacturer's point of view. For example, it is difficult
to establish a challenging sales quota in an area-of-prime-responsibility
agreement." Requiring a manufacturer to stimulate market coverage by
advertising requires the manufacturer to increase its own promotional ex-
penses. Nor are the alternatives as effective in stimulating market coverage
as closed territories.
On balance, however, the fact that substantially less restrictive alterna-
tives are available reflects unfavorably on the justification that closed ter-
64 Attorney Gen.'s Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws, Report 317-18 (1955).
65 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 278 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
66 See Note, supra note 55, at 811.
67 Id. at 809; Preston, supra note 61, at 511.
68 The holding in Schwinn may also make some of these alternatives illegal. See
note 23 supra. For purposes of testing the soundness of the Schwinn decision, how-
ever, it will be assumed that the alternatives are not illegal and that a manufacturer is
free to employ them.
69 Note, supra note 55, at 815-16 (1965). See Decision on Grundig-Consten Agree-
ment, 1 CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 1[ 2743, at 1866 (1964). But see Stone, supra note 43
at 303.
70 If quotas are set too low, they will not have the desired effect of forcing dealers
to pursue low profit accounts. On the other hand, if quotas are set impossibly high,
even aggressive dealers will fail to meet them. Reliable market data to establish a
reasonable sales quota can be acquired only at great expense, if at all.
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ritories increase market coverage. Although using alternatives may impose
some hardships on the manufacturer, these hardships are not substantial when
compared to the elimination of competition between dealers which generally
results from closed territories.
This justification may have validity in exceptional circumstances; for
example, where the manufacturer is failing or just entering the market."
Policy would seem to favor allowing the manufacturer an opportunity to
establish its new product or to reestablish itself as a viable competitor.
These policy objectives are strong enough to allow use of restrictive practices
like closed territories if they are necessary to make this opportunity avail-
able.72
In some situations use of closed territories would often be necessary for
the failing or entering manufacturer since it would be unable to acquire
dealers without offering closed territories. A dealer takes a substantial risk
when it distributes the product of a failing or entering firm because such
products usually have an untested market appeal or have an' unfavorable
reputation. 73
 In order to make distribution risks more manageable for the
dealer, the manufacturer may be required to eliminate completely intrabrand
competition. Of course, many situations may present some unusual risks to
the dealer, but except for failing and entering firms, less protection is needed
and less restrictive practices are a satisfactory solution.
Even for failing or entering firms, however, it is unlikely that long term
use of closed territories should be allowed. The justification is convincing
to the extent it allows the manufacturer to become a viable competitor, but
loses force if the manufacturer demonstrates a continuing need for artificial
props to remain in business.74
The third justification for closed territories is that they increase inter-
brand competition; that is, competition between the manufacturer's dealers
and dealers of rival brands, to a sufficient degree to outweigh the loss of intra-
brand competition, competition between the manufacturer's dealers. In essence
this justification asserts that in appropriate circumstances, closed territories
may actually stimulate rather than depress competition.
Although this justification is difficult to rebut on theoretical grounds it
has practical shortcomings. It is very difficult to isolate the effects of the
restriction on interbrand competition or to determine when interbrand com-
petition has increased sufficiently to counter any decrease in intrabrand
competition.
In some cases that may arise, any increase in interbrand competition
would be insufficient to compensate for the total elimination of intrabrand
71 Stone, supra note 43, at 316.
72 Justice Brennan, in White Motor, intimated that this argument may be relevant
in cases where the manufacturer is small in comparison with its competitors, and is
experiencing a decline in market share at the time that the restrictions are imposed.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269 & n.8 (1963). See also Stone, supra
note 43, at 311-12.
73 See Albrecht v. Herald Co. 36 U.S.L.W. 4171, 4175 (U.S. March 5, 1968)
(Harlan, J., diRcenting); Stone, supra note 43, at 316-17.
•	 74 See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Baker,
supra note 38, at 302-03.
1045
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
competition which results from closed territories. For example, if the manu- ,
facturer originating the restraint holds a very large market share, intrabrand
competition is too large a share of total competition in the market to be
safely sacrificed. Also, where the manufacturer is selling a product that is
differentiated from its competitors' products in the mind of the consumer be-
cause of its brand name, intrabrand competition is too important to be sacri-
ficed. Such differentiated brands enjoy a degree of insulation from interbrand
competition. If dealers of differentiated products are also relieved of intra-
brand competition, the product's isolation from competition becomes even
more complete and the abuses of monopoly become a greater threat."
In other situations, it would be possible to show that a reduction in intra-
brand competition was justified by a corresponding increase in interbrand
competition. Failing and entering firms which cannot obtain dealers without
reducing intrabrand competition present clear examples. If a firm is excluded
from the market place, there can be no dealers to engage in intrabrand compe-
tition in its product." If the manufacturer is allowed to enter the market by
imposing closed territories, intrabrand competition would still be eliminated,
but the product would then be in competition with other brands. An increase
in total competition would be the net effect of the restraint in such a case.
The net effect of the territorial limitation would, therefore, be procompeti-
tive. 77
Of course, this justification would be subject to the same limitations dis-
cussed above. The manufacturer could not use closed territories if less re-
strictive practices would allow the manufacturer to attract or retain dealers."
In any event, indefinite use of the restraint would not be consistent with
Sherman Act policy."
Except for failing and entering firms, most manufacturers will be unable
to show that closed territories result in an increase in interbrand competition
that outweighs the elimination of intrabrand competition which the restraint
produces. 8° A court can base its rules only on the effects which it can clearly
determine. With closed territories, that effect is reduction of intrabrand
competition, an effect inimitable to Sherman Act policy. A per se rule except
for failing and entering firms may prevent use of closed territories in some
cases where their effect is not anticompetitive, but it would be extremely dif-
ficult for a court to isolate those cases even under a detailed rule-of-reason
examination. A per se rule has the advantage of being workable and pre-
dictable.'"
2. Outlet Limitations.—Outlet limitations result when a manufacturer's
75 See Note, supra note 55, at 832-33.
76 Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 1964).
77 This was the court's conclusion in id. at 857, 861,
78 Id. at 856.
79 Stone, supra note 43, at 312-13.
89 Admitting limited exceptions to the scope of a per se rule does not do violence
to the traditional concept of a per se rule. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), where price fixing was allowed in a failing industry, and
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), where the court implied that an exception to a per se
rule for tying could be made for an entering firm.
81 See Bork, supra note 43, at 386-87.
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wholesalers and and retailers agree to sell only to outlets approved by the
manufacturer. Schwinn imposed this type of customer limitation on its
dealers. A manufacturer desires to impose such a restraint in order to confine
distribution to those dealers who meet the manufacturer's specifications. Un-
like closed territories, outlet limitations need not completely eliminate compe-
tition between dealers in the manufacturer's product. 82
 They do have some
anti-competitive effects, however, since their use may reduce' the number of
competitors in the market and thereby reduce competition."
Use of outlet limitations has been justified on several grounds: (1) that
they increase efficiency of distribution; 84 (2) that they help maintain the
product's reputation by excluding price cutters from the distribution chain; 85
(3) that they allow a manufacturer to exclude unskilled distributors in order
to avoid tort liability and maintain the reputation of its products° These
justifications will be evaluated in order.
Reduction of the number of outlets may result in savings of promotional,
supervisory and administrative expenses because the manufacturer and its
wholesalers have fewer retailers with which to deal. Vet, arguments based on
cost savings are not convincing if a significant reduction of competition is
necessary to effect cost savings, since reductions in competition relieve manu-
facturers and dealers of the pressures which promote long-run efficiency. This
result has been found to be contrary to Sherman Act policy.
The second justification advanced is that exclusion of price cutters from
a product's distribution system may enhance that product's reputation. 87 This
is one of the bases of support for fair trade laws which allow manufacturers
to set retail prices of their products in some circumstances. 88 Outside the fair
trade area, however, any intentional tampering with price competition is con-
trary to antitrust policy in spite of any indirect benefit to the manufacturer's
goodwill." Because the price mechanism is so central to competition, even an
indirect interference with it cannot be tolerated."
82 In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), customer restrictions
that eliminated all intrabrand competition were used. Justice Brennan, in his concurring
opinion, stated that these customer limitations were inherently more dangerous than
closed territories. Id. at 272. Justice Brennan's conclusion would not be applicable if
intraband competition were not eliminated.
83 See Note, Supreme Court-1966 Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 112, 238 (1967). In
this respect it should be noted that outlet limitations are generally used only by manu-
facturers of relatively expensive goods. Before purchasing such goods, a consumer is likely
to investigate several brands and visit several stores if necessary. Therefore, an outlet
limitation will not necessarily limit the number of competitive alternatives available to
the consumer so Iong as an outlet for the brand is available within a reasonable distance.
84 See Note, supra note 55, at 821-22, 823.
85 See Chaffee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 988 (1928);
Note, supra note 55, at 819-20.
86 See Chaffee, supra note 85, at 947; Note, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 198, 206-07 (1968);
Note, supra note 55, at 819-20.
87 Chaffee, supra note 85, at 988.
88 See generally 1 L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic Organization 549-85
(3d ed. 1966).
80 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944). In
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), the Court declared illegal a system
of outlet limitations based on excluding price cutters.
90 The protection of price competition from conspiratorial restraint is an
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A system of outlet limitations based on exclusion of inept dealers is more
easily justified. A manufacturer retains an important goodwill interest in its
goods as they are distributed:
[T] he manufacturer by his advertising and other commercial de-
vices has brought the consumers into a direct relation with himself.
He is trying to make them buy his product. . . . Legally, it ceases to
be owned by him some time before it reaches them, for he is sepa-
rated from them by a succession of sales through wholesalers and
retailers. These intervening passages of title have their importance
for some purposes.... But for the purpose of maintaining the repu-
tation of his product, the existence of these intermediaries has very
little significance.9'
Most consumers either do not or cannot determine whether defects in prod-
ucts are due to faulty manufacturing or faulty assembly and servicing by
dealers. Defects from either of these sources will normally be attributed to
the manufacturer and the product." Furthermore, a manufacturer may be
held liable in tort for defects which could be avoided if only skilled distribu-
tors handled the product."
Goodwill and avoidance of tort liability may be of critical importance
to the manufacturer of complicated or dangerous products. Furthermore,
both of these interests are shared by the public. The public benefits if existing
firms are able to achieve long run success and maintain their positions as
viable competitors. Irrespective of any anticompetitive impact of outlet
limitations, their effect of reducing potential sources of personal injury is
in the public interest.94
Outlet limitations need not have an unnecessarily large anticompetitive
impact. A manufacturer can adequately protect its interests without excluding
any qualified dealers. In addition, the number of dealers excluded by the
limitation could be reduced if the manufacturer were to make training courses
object of special solicitiude under the antitrust laws. We cannot respect that
solicitude by closing our eyes to the effect upon price competition of the
removal from the market, . . . of a class of traders.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966).
91 Chaffee, supra note 85, at 947. See also Note, supra note 55, at 819, 830.
92 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-57 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
93 See Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 338 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) ;
McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d
407 (1962) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Term. 392, 192 S.W. 840 (1946) ; Note,
supra note 86, at 206-07.
94
 See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 728-29 (1944).
But see Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1940), in which
the Court rejected a justification for customer limitations based on the dangerous nature
of the product. The Court felt that this protection was a matter which should be Ieft
to the self interest of the distributor. The Court feared that it would be unwise to
allow the manufacturer to employ customer restrictions for this purpose because such
restrictive trade practices could also be used for "other and illicit purposes."
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available to dealers desiring to acquire the requisite skills to distribute the
product properly.95
An alternative means of protection is available to the manufacturer which
would enable it to avoid use of outlet limitations. The manufacturer could
establish its own service centers and thereby gain control over servicing of
its product. To the extent that this course of action would protect the manu-
facturer's legitimate interests, the feasibility of establishing such facilities
should be a factor in determining its need to utilize customer limitations."
For all manufacturers, however, service centers do not provide a suitable
solution. They do not solve any difficulties which may arise from improper
assembly by dealers or insure that dealers will properly adapt the product
to the customer's requirements. Also, service is a local affair and a huge in-
vestment would be required by any manufacturer servicing a national mar-
ket. Requiring such an investment has the effect of raising entrance barriers
in an industry, an effect which in antithetical to antitrust goals. 97
On balance then, it would appear that Schwinn's per se rule is inappro-
priate for outlet limitations. It makes illegal the only practical methods by
which some manufacturers can protect their goodwill and protect consumers
from injury from their products. A better alternative, application of the rule
of reason, would allow courts to strike a proper balance between reduction
of competition inherent in a system of outlet limitations and the need of a
manufacturer to protect its legitimate interests.
C. Closed Territories, Outlet Limitations, and Schwinn
The territorial and customer limitations used by Schwinn are now illegal
when imposed on purchasers. Although the reasoning the Supreme Court
used to reach this conclusion does not appear correct, the result is sound since
Schwinn could not present particularly compelling justifications for its outlet
limitations.
Schwinn was neither a failing nor entering firm. As a result, it was not
able to show a convincing need for its territorial restrictions. In fact, Schwinn's
closed territories are an example of those for which a per se rule is most
clearly appropriate. Schwinn had a relatively large market share—it was the
largest domestic producer at the time it initiated the restraints." In addition,
Schwinn's product was differentiated from other brands as demonstrated by
the fact that Schwinn was able to prosper while charging a premium price
even though its bicycles were interchangeable with other brands. Because of
its large market share and differentiated product, Schwinn was in a weak
position to urge that its territorial restrictions were legal.
Schwinn was scarcely in a better position to argue for the legality of
95 See Address by Mary Gardiner Jones, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission,
1967 Federal Bar Ass'n, Annual Convention, in San Francisco, California, July 28, 1967.
99 Requiring a firm to engage in such integration may conflict with another anti-
trust policy objective—promotion of small business. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97 See Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale
L.J. I, 16-21 (1959).
98 The Court reports that Schwinn held a 22.5% share of the market in 1951. There
are nine domestic producers. 388 U.S. at 368-69.
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its customer limitations. Schwinn excluded low volume dealers because it was
relatively expensive to carry these accounts. Schwinn could have alleviated
this problem by not sending advertising and other promotional materials to
these accounts. Schwinn's solution, to discontinue sending bicycles to them,
was too drastic.
Nor was Schwinn's principal justification convincing. It attempted to
show that its outlet limitations were necessary to exclude dealers who were
not skilled in bicycle distribution or who did not offer service facilities. It
could not, however, demonstrate any real need to exclude these kinds of
dealers. It did not show that bicycles are so complex that special skills are
necessary for proper distribution, nor could it show that all of the approved
dealers offered service to their customers. 9° Furthermore, by consistently
refusing to approve discount houses, Schwinn indicated that its major con-
cern was not solely the avoidance of tort liability or maintenance of goodwill.
The decision of the Court, however, extends beyond the facts of Schwinn.
It announces a questionable rule of per se illegality based on the rule against
restraints on alienation. In future cases, Schwinn's per se rule will foreclose
examination of the legitimate needs of the manufacturer to impose vertical
territorial and customer limitations.
An examination of business justifications and procompetitive effects of
these restrictions is not wholly academic. The Court's rule of per se illegality
for customer and territorial restraints only obtains where there is a restraint
on alienation. Where there is no sale to a dealer, there can be no restraint on
the dealer's powers of alienation. Schwinn states that the rule of reason shall
be used to examine restraints imposed in these circumstances.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON AGENTS EXAMINED UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
Schwinn's agency exception will be viewed from two perspectives. The ex-
ception will be compared with prior law in an effort to determine the nature
of the exception, when it is to apply and how it changes prior antitrust
doctrine. Once the nature of the exception has been determined, the exception
will be evaluated in light of Sherman Act policy to determine the soundness
of the Court's distinction and to predict its viability.
The Court's concept of an "agent" in Schwinn can be compared profit-
ably with the common law definition of a selling agent or a purchaser. The
distinction between an agent and a purchaser has never been clearly defined;
arrangements between manufacturers and their dealers often contain indicia
of both types of relationship.I°° The Restatement (Second) of Agency lists
seven factors which indicate that a transferee is a selling agent rather than a
purchaser: (1) the transferor retains title to the goods; (2) the transferee
becomes responsible for an agreed price when the goods are sold rather than
immediately upon transfer; (3) the transferee is not free to fix prices at
fig Schwinn changed this aspect of its distribution system while the litigation was
in progress. For example, B.F. Goodrich, which generally provided no servicing facilities,
no longer deals in Schwinn products. The percentage of dealers providing service was
increased to 85.6% by 1961. Brief for Appellee, at 67 of n.65, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
100




which goods are resold; (4) the transferee completes the process of manu-
facturing the goods; (5) the transferor retains the risk of accidental loss;
(6) the transferee does not deal with the goods of other manufacturers;
(7) the transferee does not deal in his own name."' The Restatement empha-
sizes that none of the above factors is determinative, and that the relationship
must be viewed as a whole. 102
In Schwinn, the Court stated that a restriction on a distributor's freedom
to resell would be subject to the rule of reason when the "manufacturer re-
tains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the product and the position
and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from those
of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer ...." 103 Thus, the Court required
a finding of two of the Restatement indicia—retention by the manufacturer
of title and risk of loss—and indicated that other factors must be considered
to determine when the dealer's function is "indistinguishable from that of an
agent or salesman . . ."
Schwinn's definition of agency is apparently in harmony with the com-
mon law definition of agency except for making retention of title and risk of
loss mandatory requirements. This slight deviation from the common law
definition is not disturbing. Passage of title to the goods is probably the most
important of the factors listed, 104 and risk of loss generally follows title. 105
By clearly stating its position, the Court has at least made it easier to draft
agency agreements meeting Schwinn's requirements.
Yet the Court's agency definition goes further and in doing so creates
interpretational problems, First, the Court implies that a salesman is an agent
and, therefore, that restrictions on salesmen will be subject to antitrust
scrutiny. Since the word "salesmen" is often used to refer to employees, the
Court may be suggesting that a manufacturer is forbidden to restrict not
only independent dealers, but also its own employees. Whether restrictions on
employees should be subject to antitrust scrutiny is a subject which has re-
ceived extensive treatment elsewhere. It is generally concluded that restric-
tions on employees should be exempt from the antitrust laws to allow manu-
facturers to exercise control over the internal workings of their firm.'"
Fortunately, the word "salesman" is sufficiently broad that it is possible the
Court did not intend that employees be included.107 In any event, the facts
of Schwinn presented restrictions on independent dealers, not employees.
The second interpretational problem is raised by the Court's applica-
tion of its exception to the facts of Schwinn. The Court stated that Schwinn
101 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14J, Comment b (1957).
102 Id.
193 388 U.S. at 380.
104 Klaus, supra note 100, at 443-44.
105 See Note, supra note 83, at 237 & n.11 where it is suggested that Schwinn's
requirement of risk of loss refers to "entrepreneurial risk" rather than risk of destruction.
106 See Klaus, supra note 100, at 456-57; Note, supra note 83, at 236. See also
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 279 (1942).
107 See Address by Edwin M. Zimmerman, First Assistant, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 1967 Federal Bar Ass'n, Annual Convention, in San Francisco, California,
July 28, 1967. Mr. Zimmerman interperts Schwinn as requiring the dealer's function to
be very close to that of a salesman. He does not, however, interpret Schwinn's prohibi-
tion to extend to employees of the manufacturer.
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Plan sales would be examined under the rule of reason."' The dissenters ex-
pressed relief that the majority's per se rule will have only a minimal effect
on Schwinn since most of its sales are made through the Schwinn Plan."'" If
the rationale of the majority is applied to the Schwinn Plan,n° however, it is
apparent that only that part of the plan that imposes restrictions on whole-
salers should be given rule-of-reason treatment. Under the Schwinn Plan, re-
tailers purchase the goods, and as a result, the per se rule in the opinion
should prohibit Schwinn from imposing restrictions on them. Because the
restrictions on retailers are an integral part of the Schwinn Plan, a holding
that these restrictions are involved per se would have much more than a
minimal effect on Schwinn's distributional system. It would, in fact, seriously
undermine Schwinn's ability to select its retail outlets since authorized re-
tailers would be left free to sell to unauthorized retailers. 111
The apparent inconsistency between the statement of both the majority
and dissenters on the effect of Schwinn and the majority's rationale leaves
two ways of reading the case. The first is that restrictions imposed on whole-
salers and retailers who are operating under the Schwinn Plan are examined
under the rule of reason in spite of the fact that as to the retailers they are
restraints on alienation. If the Court intended this result, it laid no logical
framework to reach it. Schwinn's retailers are not agents in any sense. The
degree of restraint is no different whether the retailers receive the goods from
the wholesalers or directly from the manufacturer under the Schwinn Plan. If
there is any distinction to be drawn, the opinion gives no clue as to how to
draw it.
The second possible reading is that even though a restraint on alienation
is present in Schwinn Plan sales, there is another redeeming feature also pres-
ent. This is unlikely, however. Redeeming charactristics of distribution sys-
tems presenting restraints on alienation on purchasers will henceforth be
ignored, and the Court presents no reason why distribution systems like the
Schwinn Plan should be treated differently. Perhaps the only conclusion which
can be drawn from the Court's inclusion of Schwinn Plan sales in the class of
restraints to be measured by the rule of reason is that the Court did not notice
that plan presented a restraint on the retailer's power of alienation.
In addition to the vagueness that inheres in the Court's discussion of
Schwinn's agency restrictions, the Court's application of the rule of reason to
the facts of Schwinn creates some difficulty in applying Schwinn to future
cases. The Court stated that it was favorably impressed with the freedom
Schwinn's agents were given to handle other brands of bicycles and to set
their own resale prices.' 12 The Court related these factors to the reasonable-
ness of the restraint, but the Restatement (Second) of Agency lists these
108
 388 U.S. at 380.
100 Id. at 388.
110
 See p. 1033-34 supra for a description of the Schwinn Plan.
111 See Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. Law. 669, 683-87 (1968), for a discus-
sion of other particular problems Schwinn faces in attempting to comply with the
Court's decision.
112 Permitting "agents" to set their own prices may create Robinson-Patman price
discrimination problems. Comment, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements After the
Schwinn Case, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 514, 526 (1968).
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factors as indicia of a buyer-seller, not a principal-agent, relationship. A
draftsman attempting to draw up an agency agreement meeting Schwinn's
requirements will find this discussion troublesome. The agreement may have
to contain provisions inconsistent with an agency relationship in order to be
found reasonable. Unless a delicate balance is achieved, a court may hold
either that the agreement does not create an agency relationship or that any
restrictions imposed are unreasonable.
Irrespective of the precise breadth of application which Schwinn's agency
exception will enjoy, it is of critical importance to determine the effect on prior
antitrust law of the agency exception to Schwinn's per se rule. The Sherman
Act proscribes only combinations, conspiracies and contracts in restraint of
trade. 113 As a result, a plurality of parties acting together in one of these ways
has traditionally been considered a prerequisite to invocation of the Sherman
Act. Since the parties in a principal-agent relationship have been considered
a single entity, traditional antitrust doctrine has viewed agency as an effective
shield to Sherman Act liability.
This view was firmly established by the Supreme Court in United States
v. General Elec. Co. 1" General Electric, by virtue of several patents, held a
near monopoly in the manufacture of electric light bulbs. Under license agree-
ments with other firms the licensees were treated as General Electric's agents
for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing light bulbs. The license
agreements required these agents to follow prices and terms of sale set by
General Electric. The Government brought suit charging that the distribu-
tion system was merely a device to enable General Electric to fix prices. The
Court held that the licensing agreements created a valid agency relationship,
and further noted:
[T] here is nothing ... which requires us to hold that genuine con-
tracts of agency . . . however comprehensive . . . are violations of
the Anti-Trust Act. The owner of an article, patented or otherwise,
is not violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by . . . fixing
the price by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to
such consumer.115
General Electric's broad ruling has been eroded. In Simpson v. Union
Oil Co.116 a private suit was brought by a service station operator, Simpson,
against his gasoline supplier, Union Oil. Simpson had leased the station from
Union Oil and handled Union's products under a consignment agreement.
Union set the minimum price at which all station operators could sell gasoline.
113 Note 11 supra.
114 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926). See also Attorney Gen.'s Nat'l Comm. to Study the
Antitrust Laws, Report 30-31 (1955).
115 272 U.S. at 488. But see United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276-77
(1942):
Ifilowever useful ran agency agreement] . . . may be in allocating risks
between the parties and determining their rights inter se, its terms do not
necessarily control when the rights of others intervene, whether they be credi-
tors or the sovereign.
115 377 U.S. 13 (1964). The language in Masonite, quoted above, was substantially
repeated in Simpson. 377 U.S. 13, 17-18 (1964).
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Simpson sold gasoline below this price and Union refused to renew Simpson's
license. Simpson brought suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
held that even though a valid agency relationship may have been created,
Union's policies violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court distin-
guished General Electric because, unlike Simpson, it involved a patented
product.
Schwinn follows Simpson in not granting antitrust immunity to agency
agreements.'" Schwinn departs from Simpson in one important respect, how-
ever. In Simpson the Court found that the consignment device was no shield
to antitrust liability and applied a per se rule as in other price-fixing cases.
In Schwinn, the Court held that because the restrictions were imposed through
agency agreements, a rule-of-reason approach was required even though the
restriction under consideration was per se illegal in a sales context. Using the
rule of reason, it upheld Schwinn's restrictions.
Because the facts in the two cases are very similar, 118
 perhaps Schwinn
overrules Simpson." 9
 It is possible, however, to construct a rationale that
will make Schwinn and Simpson consistent. The focal point of this analysis
is the Schwinn holding that the presence of an agency relationship makes a
per se rule inappropriate. By definition, a per se rule is invoked only where
the practice involved is at all times an unreasonable restraint of trade. This
definition suggests that Schwinn treats the presence of the agency relation-
ship as more than a threshold inquiry to rule-of-reason treatment. That is,
if the presence of an agency relationship were not a factor tending to make a
restraint reasonable, then any inquiry into the reasonableness of a restraint
imposed on an agent would be a useless act. The fact that the restraint is
per se illegal in the sales context would demand that the restraint be unreason-
able—in effect, per se illegal—in the agency context.
Because of this basic principle, it is clear that in Schwinn the agency
relation is treated as a valid justification that will outweigh the effect of the
restraint, In fact, it is the only justification of sufficient magnitude to out-
weigh the effect of the restraint. Whether it does outweigh the effect of the
restraint depends on a number of factors, one of which must be the kind of
restraint involved. It is here that the distinction between Schwinn and
Simpson lies.
Simpson involved price fixing, whereas Schwinn involves customer re-
striction. It may be that the Court considers price fixing to be a more per-
117 In fact, Schwinn makes it clear that all agency agreements are subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. In Simpson, the Court was somewhat ambiguous as to whether its ration..
ale extended to all agency agreements or just to those of questionable validity and to
those used as a "device" to effect illegal practices.
118 Simpson, unlike Schwinn, did present what the Court referred to as coercion.
The importance to the Court of coercion in Simpson has been minimized by some
writers. See, e.g., Rahl, Control of the Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case—A Study in
Anti-Trust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1966) ; Note, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 519, 523
(1965). But see Note, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 294 (1965) ; Note, 43 Texas .
 L. Rev. 569,
573-74 (1965). In Schwinn, coercion is conspicuously absent from the list of factors that
the Court indicated were determinative of reasonableness.
119 Some commentators have reached this conclusion. See Keck, supra note 111,
at 669, 682; Note, supra note 86, at 211-12,
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nicious restraint than customer restrictions. 12° If so, the agency holdings of
Schwinn and Simpson may be entirely consistent. The agency relationship
may be a sufficient justification to outweigh the effect of customer restrictions
but not sufficient to outweigh the effect of price fixing.
There are practical problems for the antitrust bar if this rationalization
of Schwinn's agency holding is correct. Not only would restrictions be classi-
fied according to their antitrust treatment—per se rule or rule of reason, but
further gradation of per se offenses would be necessary to determine which
retraints are significantly less objectionable when imposed on agents. Un-
fortunately, Schwinn provides no standards by which this gradation of "per se-
ness" can be accomplished.
The validity of the submitted distinction between Schwinn and Simpson
is dependent upon the antitrust importance of the ancient rule against re-
straints on alienation.' 21 An analysis of the validity of Schwinn's agency ex-
ception must start with the basis for the Court's per se rule—the rule against
restraints on alienation. The rule is applicable where there is a sale, but not
where goods are passed from principal to agent. As a result, the per se rule
based on the rule must be reexamined in the agency context.
Restraints on alienation conflict with the Sherman Act because they res-
train the freedom of a merchant to sell as he wishes. 122 They restrain the most
aggressive dealers and support unaggressive or inefficient dealers. On the other
hand the Sherman Act has been used to foster free and open competition.
Restraints used to support inefficient competitors and stifle agressive com-
petitors clearly conflict with this purpose. The benefits from competition
which Sherman Act policy fosters are derived from the aggressive competi-
tion which is stifled by restraints on aggressive competitors.
The practices of Schwinn are good examples of the anticompetitive effects
of restraints on alienation. Schwinn's customer limitations were used to ex-
clude discount houses from Schwinn's distribution chain. This resulted in
anticompetitive effects at three levels of distribution: (1) the freedom of
Schwinn's wholesalers and retrailers to choose customers was restricted; (2)
competition was reduced at the retail level since some competitors were ex-
cluded from the market; and (3) the consumer suffered because a re-
duction in aggressive price competition resulted from the exclusion of dis-
count houses from Schwinn's list of authorized retailers. When a restriction
120 Price fixing was an established per se illegal offense before Simpson. See United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940).
121 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-07(1911), for a discussion of how vertical price fixing presents a restraint on alienation.
122 The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely:
so has the individual. All interferences with individual liberty of action in
trading . . . are contrary to public policy and therefore void.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911), quoting
Lord Macnaughten in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894]
A.C. 535, 565. See also Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959):
Even when they operated . . . temporarily to stimulate competition they were
banned. For . . . "such agreements . . . cripple the freedom of traders and
thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgement."
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is imposed on an agent, on the other hand, there can be no restraint on
alienation because there is no sale. The anticompetitive effects that made
the restraint on alienation objectionable under the Sherman Act may still
remain, however. If the Court in Schwinn was using the absence of a technical
restraint on alienation to support its distinction between the sales and agency
situation, the Court has ignored this obvious fact. The agents which Schwinn
leaves subject to customer restrictions are independent merchants, and their
freedom to wage aggressive competition and to exercise independent business
judgments has been substantially reduced. Despite the lack of a technical
restraint on alienation, Schwinn's customer limitations on agents appear no
less objectionable than customer limitations on purchasers.
It is more likely, however, that the Court considered the agency rela-
tionship to be a justification for the restraints imposed. Although the anti-
competitive impact of restrictions on independent agents is not appreciably
less than would result from imposing a similar restriction on purchasers, an
additional factor must be considered. In an agency system of distribution,
if the manufacturer restricts the exercise of business judgment of distrib-
utors, the manufacturer also assumes the attendant business risks. When a
manufacturer directly bears the risks of distribution, the manufacturer is
understandably reluctant to submit to the judgment of its distributors on
marketing practices and since the dealers stake is smaller, any restriction
on the discretion of the dealers is more easily justified.
If the Court considered these factors to be important irrespective of
their competitive significance, Schwinn's agency exception can be rationalized.
It remains difficult, however, to reconcile the agency exception with Schwinn's
per se rule. If imposition of vertical customer and territorial restrictions is
so contrary to antitrust policy that a per se rule is justified for restrictions
on purchasers, it is difficult to understand why retention of business risks
makes the restriction subject to rule-of-reason treatment. Apparently the
Court is applying an inconsistent standard.' 23
It is particularly difficult to reconcile Schwinn's different rules for
restrictions on agents and purchasers because Schwinn suggests that the
assumption of business risks by use of an agency distribution is not only
the threshold requirement for rule-of-reason treatment of customer restric-
tions, but it may be the sole requirement for their legality. Despite Schwinn's
large market share, its relatively uncomplex product and its practice of exclud-
ing discount houses, the Court upheld Schwinn's customer restrictions as
reasonable. The Court did not reveal in what way allowing Schwinn to
retain these restrictions would improve its competitive posture in the bicycle
manufacturing industry, or what circumstances placed Schwinn in need of
continuing restrictions on its agent-distributors. Since the Court declared
Schwinn's restrictions to be lawful, Schwinn suggests that the Court is, in fact,
declaring a rule of near per se legality for customer restrictions on agents.
123 Professor Handler criticizes the Court for distinguishing between the agency
and sale situations: "Form is exalted over substance to a degree unparalleled in the
history of antitrust." Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 Va. L.
Rev. 1667, 1684 (1967). He was particularly disturbed that the Court found sale and
agency transactions to have different effects on competition. Id. at 1683-84.
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If this interpretation is correct, many other manufacturers should also be
able to meet Schwinn's rule-of-reason requirements, but some words of caution
should be mentioned since Schwinn presents a unique fact situation in some
respects. In spite of the fact that Schwinn was one of the largest firms in
the bicycle industry, its distributors were in competition with even larger
mass merchandizers such as Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. Both
the district court and the Supreme Court were impressed with the fact that
Schwinn was only trying to meet competition from vertically integrated
rivals by adopting some aspects of vertical integration. 124 Of equal import-
ance, the price-fixing issue was removed from the case by the Government's
failure to appeal the district court's dismissal of that issue. For this reason,
later attempts by the Government to show that Schwinn's customer restric-
tions produced an adverse effect on prices met with strong and apparently
successful opposition by Schwinn. In future cases, the Government will
probably not allow itself to be precluded procedurally from showing that
an adverse effect on prices will result from customer restrictions. Future
defendants who exclude discount houses will probably be at a marked dis-
advantage compared to Schwinn in attempting to justify their restrictions
since the Court indicated in Schwinn that interferences with price competi-
tion will be fatal to the legality of customer restrictions, even if imposed on
agents.' 25
Only later litigation can decide whether Schwinn's restrictions on agents
were tested under a different rule of reason than has been traditionally applied
in antitrust cases. The evidence that Schwinn does apply a new rule is incon-
clusive and largely speculative. The safest course for the present would be
to assume that Schwinn does not announce a rule of per se legality but that
the Court simply felt compelled by the lower court's findings to uphold
Schwinn's customer restrictions imposed on agents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The status of vertical customer and territorial limitations is still not
settled. In Schwinn, the Court declared vertical territorial and customer
restrictions to be illegal per se when imposed on purchasers and subject to
the rule of reason when imposed on agents. The per se rule is of questionable
validity and its agency exception is illogical. The opinion reflects almost no
awareness or examination of the economic or policy issues that were before
the Court. But the case is now law, and manufacturers who depend upon
vertical territorial and customer restrictions must comply with Schwinn's
requirements.
In reality, it is doubtful that Schwinn has settled the law with respect
to vertical territorial and customer limitations, in spite of the announced
per se rule. The Court indicates by several passages in the opinion that it is
not yet ready to give its final word on their legality, and is postponing to
the future a determination of the extent to which it will permit their use.
The Court stated: "[W]e are not prepared to introduce the inflexibility
124 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 334 (1965); 388
U.S. at 380-81.
126 388 U.S. at 380-81.
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which a per se rule might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical
restrictions of territory and all franchising . . . . "126 Furthermore, many parts
of the opinion are unclear—for example, the Court's definition of agency, its
discussion of whether all restrictions imposed under the Schwinn Plan
were found reasonable and the precise rationale for its per se rule. In fact,
the Court clothes the whole opinion in obscure language which will permit
considerable latitude in later interpretation. Perhaps, the Court in Schwinn
did not go far beyond its position in White Motor. It may simply be saying
that it is unfavorably impressed with vertical territorial and customer limita-
tions, but if presented with compelling circumstances it may allow them
to be used. The Court has gone at least one step beyond its position in White
Motor since it has drastically limited the kinds of distribution systems in
which customer and territorial restrictions can be used. Henceforth, a per se
rule may be avoided only by use of an agency arrangement with distributors.
It is questionable how long the agency exception will be available. At
least with respect to the traditional antitrust policy of promoting free com-
petition, the agency exception is irreconcilable with the rationale for
Schwinn's per se rule. There can be little question what result the Court will
reach when forced to choose between Schwinn's per se rule and its agency
exception. The Court was very anxious to declare a per se rule in Schwinn,
and once a per se rule has been announced, the Court has never narrowed
but rather has broadened its reach.
PETER J. MONTE
121] Id. at 379.
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